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ABSTRACT 
Wireless mesh network (WMN) consists of two parts: mesh 
access points which are relatively static and energy-rich devices, 
and mesh clients which are relatively dynamic and power 
constrained. In this paper, we present a new model for WMN end-
to-end security which divides authentication process into two 
phases: Mesh Access Point which is based on asymmetric 
cryptography and Mesh Client which is based on a server-side 
certificate such as EAP-TTLS.   
General Terms 
Algorithms, Performance, Design, Reliability, Experimentation, 
Security, Standardization, Theory. 
Keywords 
Hybrid mesh; network security; end-to-end authentication; server 
mobile; mobile router. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless mesh networks have appeared as a promising design 
model for next generation wireless networks which have grown 
rapidly due to recent developments such as easy installation and 
low setup cost when compared to wired networks [1]. WMN is a 
promising new technology which has been adopted as the wireless 
internetworking solution for the near future due to their self-
healing, self-configuring and self-optimizing capabilities [2]. The 
most commercial form of WMN is called hybrid mesh networks 
[3], shown in Figure 1. Hybrid mesh networks contain mesh 
access points (MAP) and mesh clients (MC). MAPs are relatively 
static and energy-rich devices that have multiple wireless network 
interfaces. On the other hand, Mesh Clients are relatively mobile 
and power constrained devices such as notebook, Smartphone, 
and smart pad [4]. 
 
 
The routing protocols used for WMNs can be classified into two 
types: Reactive Routing Protocols in which routes are established 
only when required and generally via flooding of Route Request 
packets in the network, and Proactive Routing Protocols in which 
routes are established before actual usage through periodical 
exchanges of connectivity information [5] [6] [7]. Both protocols 
have their individual advantages. Reactive protocols focus on 
minimizing control packet overhead such as Ad hoc On Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) [8], Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
[9],Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [10] etc. 
while the proactive protocols attempt to minimize the route 
establishment delays such as OLSR [9], DSDV [10]. 
However, since these routing protocols have been designed for 
relatively homogenous MANETs, they will not provide optimum 
security for hybrid WMNs. An important security goal of a 
wireless mesh network is to protect the end-to-end communication 
between the device and its home network in general, and to 
protect the application content from being eavesdropped or 
modified during its transmission in particular. 
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Figure 1. Hybrid Wireless Mesh Network. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 KAMAN 
Please Kerberos Assisted Authentication in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks [11] uses multiple Kerberos servers for distributed 
authentication and load distribution. In Kaman only the users 
know the secret key or passwords and the servers know a 
cryptographic hash of these passwords. All Kaman servers share a 
secret key with each other server. In Kaman all servers 
periodically, or on-demand, replicate their databases with each 
other. Kaman uses an election based server selection mechanism.  
2.2 TAODV 
Ticket Based Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector [12] is a ticket-
based security protocol foe WMNs that is based upon the AODV 
protocol, which is a cross layer protocol which works at network 
layer but also provides security for data exchange and avoids 
transfer of ARP messages for finding MAC addresses of source 
and destination. 
2.3 Secure Extension to the OLSR protocol 
Use The Secure Extension to the OLSR protocol [13] has only 
provided integrity and not confidentiality by signing each OLSR 
control packet with digital signature for authenticating the 
message. The digital signature is based on symmetric keys [14]. 
All OLSR control traffic is signed for every hop. This doesn’t 
provide end-to-end signatures. 
3. Our Proposed Model 
Our proposed model aims to achieve an end-to-end authentication 
in WMN. In order to achieve such a goal we have divided the 
authentication process into two phases: the MAP phase in which a 
new MAP conducts the network, and the MC phase in which a 
new MC conducts the network. 
At the MAP phase, we aim to use asymmetric cryptographic sine 
MAP is an energy rich device [14] on the other hand, MC devices 
in the second part of the authentication use server-side certificate 
such as EAP-TTLS and PEAP. 
3.1 MAP Phase 
When a MAP is connected to a WMN during setup stage, it has to 
do the following steps: (1) MAP sends its details including the 
type (1 for MAP / 0 for MC) and MAC address to an 
Authentication Server (AS). (2) AS will send key generation 
mechanism back to the MAP after checking MAC address in a 
stored list. (3) MAP will generate its public and secret keys, and 
then sends its public key (PKMAP) to the AS. Then AS generates a 
shared secret key (KMAP) for new MAP and AS on the basis of 
public key of MAP and its secret key by using Fixed Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol. (4) AS generates a ticket for new 
MAP with required info (MAP ID, IP, issue time, expiration time) 
and sign it with its private key. Then, after signing, AS will 
encrypt that ticket with the shared secret key and then forward this 
encrypted ticket to new MAP. After receiving encrypted ticket, 
new MAP will first generate a shared secret key on the basis of 
AS’s public key and its secret key (as AS generated) and then will 
decrypt the ticket. For future communication (route discovery 
request/reply) MAP will use this ticket. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 MC Phase 
When a new MC is connected to the WMN, it has to provide 
credentials to the AS. These credentials can be user-name/ID-
number and password (via PAP, CHAP, or MD5 challenges) [15]. 
In this phase server-side certificate such as EAP-TTLS can be 
used. After successful authentication, the mobile node will receive 
a secret key that shares with the authentication server (AS). 
3.3 MAP –to- MAP Authentication  
As it has been mentioned, MAP depends on proactive protocols 
such as OLSR in order to build routing table through periodical 
exchanges of connectivity information, when a MAP discovers a 
new neighboring MAP, a secure route must be established. In order 
to do so, the first MAP sends both its identifier and the identifier of 
destination MAP to the AS, which in turn looks up both identifiers 
in its database in order to verify the validity of both clients. 
MAP1        AS:  {IDMAP1, IDMAP2} KMAP1|| Nonce 
AS sends ticketMAP2 along with the Authenticator {KMAP1, KMAP12, 
IDMAP1, T} in which KMAP12 is the secret shared key between two 
MAPs and T is the lifetime of that key, this Authenticator provides 
MAP1 with the shared key and proof that this is the right shared 
key to use with MAP2 at this time. 
AS         MAP1:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1 || {KMAP12, times, Nonce, 
IDMAP2} KMAP1 
 
MAP1 decrypts Authenticator in order to validate its information 
and then creates a new message with a fresh timestamp; this 
message contains both identifiers in addition to ticketMAP2 and 
encrypted values that express MAP2 identifier with the fresh 
timestamp. And then send this message to MAP2. 
MAP1        MAP2:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1, IDMAP2 ||timestamp 
After receiving this message, MAP2 decrypts ticketMAP2 with 
KMAP2 to obtain KMAP12 which in turn is used to get the encrypted 
values, and then MAP2 validates timestamp by comparing it to 
local time. In case the verification succeeds, MAP2 sends a new 
encrypted message with KMAP12, this message contains the 
timestamp sent before by MAP1 and a new key instead of KMAP12 
called subkey used as a shared key between two clients in their 
communications. When the message received MAP1 decrypts it 
and verifies timestamp. If the verification succeeded, MAP1 
knows that MAP2 has received the previous message 
 
(1) MAP AS:      Type|| MAC|| Nonce 
(2) AS    MAP:  key generation mechanism|| Nonce 
(3) MAP  AS:     PKMAP || Nonce 
(4) AS    MAP: {ticketMAP-AS}KMAP || Nonce 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MAP Phase 
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3.4 Client–to-Client Authentication 
For Client–to-Client Authentication, our proposed model uses 
EAP authentication with a modified version of a scheme known as 
a four-pass Kerberos protocol [16][17]. 
When a new MC is connected to the WMN, it approves itself to the 
Authentication Server (AS) in order to get a secret key shared with 
the AS in addition to a unique identifier ID. 
Whenever an MC wants to establish a secure connection with 
another MC, it approaches the AS and does the protocol as 
following steps: 
The first Client MC1, sends both its identifier and the identifier of 
destination client MC2 to the AS which in turn searches for both 
MCs identifiers in its database in order to verify the validity of 
both clients.  
MC1       AS:   IDMC1 || IDMC2 || Nonce 
AS sends ticketMC2 which contains KMC12 and the lifetime of that 
key, this ticket is sent to MC1 with the Authenticator which 
provides MC1 with the shared key and proof that this is the right 
shared key to use with MC2 at this time. 
AS        MC1:   ticketMC2 || IDMC1 || {KMC12, lifetime, Nonce, 
IDMC2}KMC1 
MC1 decrypts Authenticator in order to validate its information. It 
then creates a new message with a fresh timestamp. This message 
contains both identifiers in addition to ticketMC2 and encrypted 
values that express MC2 identifier with the fresh timestamp. And 
then send this message to MC2. 
MC1 MC2:   ticketMC2 || Authenticator 
After receiving this message, MC2 decrypts ticketMC2 with KMC2 to 
obtain KMC12 which in turn is used to get the encrypted values. 
Then MC2 validates timestamp and local time comparing the life 
time sent from MC1.In case the verification succeeds, MC2 sends 
a new encrypted message with KMC12. This message contains both 
the timestamp sent before by MC1 and a new key called subkey 
instead of KMC12 which is used as a shared key between the two 
clients in their communications. When the message is received, 
MC1 decrypts it and verifies timestamp. If the verification 
succeeds, then MC1 knows that MC2 has received the previous 
message in proper form and decrypt the shared key correctly. 
MC2  MC1: {timestamp, subkey}KMC12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We notice that all routes between MAP’s are all secured through 
MAP-to-MAP authentication steps, so that when MC1 sends a 
message to MC2, this message is encrypted by the shared secret 
key subkey between every single MAP pair, and this provides both 
node–to–node and end-to-end security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MC Phase 
 
 
 
 
a) MAP1 AS:  {IDMAP1 , IDMAP2 } KMAP1||ticketMAP1||Nonce 
b) AS MAP1:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1 || {KMAP12, lifetime, 
Nonce, IDMAP2}KMAP1 
c) MAP1 MAP2:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1, IDMAP2 ||timestamp 
d) MAP2 MAP1: {timestamp, subkey}KMAP12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. MAP-to-MAP Authentication 
 
 
 
 
a) MC1 AS:   IDMC1 || IDMC2 || Nonce 
b) AS MC1:   ticketMC2 || IDMC1 || {KMC12, lifetime, Nonce, 
IDMC2}KMC1 
c) MC1 MC2:   ticketMC2 || Authenticator 
d) MC2 MC1: {timestamp, subkey}KMC12 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Client-to-Client authentication 
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4. Simulation 
We have used ns-2 simulator to simulate our proposed model 
(THWMP) protocol and to compare it with existing protocols 
HWMP and SHWMP[19]. We have simulated 50 static mesh 
nodes in a 1500 x1500 m2 area. We use 5 to 10 distinct source-
destination pairs that are selected randomly. Traffic source are 
CBR (constant bit-rate). Each source sends data packets of 512 
bytes at the rate of four packets per second during the simulation 
period of 900 seconds. 
In order to compare HWMP with SHWMP, both protocols were 
run under identical traffic scenario. Both on-demand and 
proactive mode were simulated. We consider Packet delivery ratio 
and End-to-end delay as performance metrics. 
As shown in Figure 7, the packet delivery ratio is better in 
SHWMP for both on demand and proactive mode than that of 
HWMP. We assume that 10% misbehaving nodes are present in 
the network. Since the misbehaving nodes participate in the route 
discovery process, in HWMP sometimes packets are intentionally 
dropped by the misbehaving nodes. But, in the proposed protocol, 
misbehaving nodes cannot participate in the route discovery 
process and thus always achieve a higher packet delivery ratio. 
  
 
Figure 8 depicts that the average end-to-end delay of data packets 
for both protocols are almost equal. We run the simulation using 5 
and 10 source-destination pairs, and as the traffic load increases, 
end-to-end delay also increases. It is also evident that the effect of 
route acquisition delay on average end-to-end delay is not 
significant.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a new model for securing end-to-end 
wireless mesh network with ticked based-authentication. This 
model divides the authentication process into two phases: MAP 
phase and MC phase. In the first, our proposed model 
authenticates MAP using asymmetric cryptography [19] 
depending on MAP’s MAC address. This phase ensures the 
securing of all network paths by establishing ticket based between 
every single MAP pair. Whereas in the second phase, the 
authentication process is done by proving the new MC to the AS 
using preconfigured credentials. This is required because the MC 
doesn’t have any certificate yet. After that, the AS uses a server-
side certificate to authenticate the MC. This is a secure method 
that saves MC battery. Our proposed model uses a modified 
version of a scheme known as four-pass Kerberos protocol in 
MAP-to-MAP authentication and MC-to-MC authentication. By 
doing this, we ensure the providing of  a secure node-to-node 
routes for all routes in the network in addition to the end-to-end 
security message that cannot be decrypted without the secret key 
at the receiver MC with reasonable consuming to the battery at 
MC side. . 
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